
Sidney Schoeffler was the founding genius of the PIMS® programme. This article is a 2023 up-date of his 1977 research. The intervening 43 years have amply demonstrated how timeless his findings were: remarkably little needed changing.

Study of the 4000+ businesses in the PIMS® data bank clearly establishes the following nine propositions:
The operating results achieved by a particular business - its profit, cash flow, growth etc. - are determined in a rather regular and predictable fashion by the “laws of nature” that operate in business situations. (By a “business situation” we mean the competitive interplay among the various buyers and sellers of a particular product line or service in a particular served market.) This does not mean that we can foretell the exact results of every business in any given short period. It means that we can estimate the approximate results (within 5 points of after-tax ROI) of most businesses over a moderately long period (3-5 years), on the basis of observable characteristics of the market and of the strategies employed by the business itself and its competitors.
Business situations can be understood by an empirical scientific approach, and therefore the process of formulating business strategy is becoming an applied science.
In the same way that human beings - despite their many differences in appearance, personality, religion, behaviour, state of health, etc. - obey the same laws of physiology, businesses - despite their many differences in product, company personality, state of profit health, etc. - obey the same laws of the marketplace. The first fact makes possible the applied science of medicine, in which a trained physician can usefully treat any human being. The second makes possible the applied science of business strategy, in which a trained strategist can usefully function in any business. Of course, many physicians and many strategists elect to specialise, but that merely implements a division of labour; it does not argue against the principle.
Some businesses are very profitable or have favourable cash flows; others are very unprofitable or have unfavourable cash flows. When we try to understand the variance between them, the laws of the marketplace account for most of that variance.
This means that the structural characteristics of the served market, of the business itself, and of its competitors constitute about 75% of the reasons for success or failure, and the operating skill or luck of the management constitute about 25%.
Another way of stating Finding III is to say that doing “the right thing” is three times more important than doing “the thing right”.
These nine influences constitute most of the determination of business success or failure. In approximate order of importance, they are:
Additionally:
There is such a thing as being a good or poor “operator”. A good operator can improve the profitability of a strong strategic profile or minimise the damage of a weak one and is therefore a favourable element of a business; a poor operator is the opposite. But the 75/25 logic says that really excellent managers spend most effort on improving their strategic profiles.
Sometimes they tend to offset each other. For example, lower customer purchase amount (which tends to increase earnings) often goes along with more complex customer logistics (which tends to decrease earnings). Similarly, lean investment often goes with outsourcing. In these cases, the net effect is what matters.
Sometimes they reinforce each other. For example, strong market position (which by itself acts favourably on earnings) and high quality (which also acts that way) usually go together. In that case, a cumulative effect occurs.
Frequently the effect of a strategic factor reverses, depending on other factors. For example, a high level of R&D effort tends to increase earnings, if done by a business with strong market position, and to decrease earnings, if done by a business with weak position.
Therefore, when formulating business strategy, it is dangerous to use a simplistic logic.
In modelling profitability for a business, it doesn’t matter if the product is chemical or electrical, edible or toxic, large or small, or purple or yellow. (Except insofar as these are attributes of customer preference - e.g. the banana business!). What matters are the characteristics of the business, such as the nine cited before. Two businesses making entirely different products, but having similar market growth, customer structure, production structure, market position, etc., usually show similar operating results. And two businesses making the same products but differing in their profile generally show different operating results.
This means basically two things. First, when the “fundamentals” of a business change over time (for example, its relative quality improves or its vertical integration goes down, whether by inadvertence or as a result of deliberate strategy) its profitability and net cash flow move in the direction of the norm for the new position. Second, if the actually realised performance of a business deviates from the expected norm (expected on the basis of the laws of the marketplace), it will tend to move back toward that norm.
A good strategy is one that can confidently be expected to have good consequences; a poor strategy is one that can confidently be expected to have poor consequences. The laws of the marketplace are a reliable source of confidence in estimating both the cost of making a given strategic move and the benefit of having made it.
The fundamentals do not always operate in a simplistic way, as noted before. Thus, it is not always a good idea to expand a strong, well-situated business, or to harvest or divest a weak one. The former business may well be on the verge of trouble; and the latter may be in a situation where a minor effort can produce a major improvement.
Benchmarks firmly based in the empirical laws of the marketplace are therefore very helpful tools of business strategy.
These nine findings, taken together, clearly say that it is productive to think about business strategy in a thoroughly professional manner, by supplementing the executive’s imagination and creativity with a rigorous and science-based estimate of the probable consequences of strategic moves.
Since Sid’s piece was written, the PIMS® databases have expanded in types of business, geo-graphical coverage, and business metrics. The PIMS® findings have stood up through all this diversity and through the information revolution. In general, even the coefficients haven’t changed: a doubling of relative market share is worth the same amount of ROI or ROS in the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s. and the 2010s. Some factors reflecting technical pro-gress (e.g. capital and labour productivity) have improved steadily, of course, but the profit ben-efit has generally gone to the customer. The only exception to the PIMS laws is “non-marketplace” businesses where success is artificially regulated or dependent on a unique factor cost: e.g. water supply or Saudi oil. Sid’s framework foreshadowed successive fashions for “ex-cellence”, five forces, TQM, core competencies, shareholder value, reengineering, benchmark-ing, balanced scorecards, the “dot-com” boom, the financial crash and artificial intelligence. This timelessness only underlines his achievements and the confidence with which we can rely on them for the next 40 years.